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Abstract 
In this study, we investigated the evolution of Chinese guarantee networks from angle of sub-
patterns. First, we found that the mutual, 2-out-stars, and triangle sub-patterns were motifs in 2- 
and 3-node subgraphs. Considering the heterogeneous financial characteristics of nodes, we found 
that small firms tended to form a mutual guarantee relationship and large firms were likely to be 
the guarantors in 2-out-stars sub-patterns. Furthermore, we conducted a dynamic study on 15 sub-
patterns, which consisted of 2- and 2-node sub-patterns, and found that the subgraphs were highly 
influenced by the 2008 financial crisis and Chinese stimulus program. Furthermore, during the 
financial crisis, the mutual guarantee relationship decreased, due to the bankruptcy of firms. 
Additional local interconnection (mutual and triangle sub-patterns) was established with the 
significant increase in the initiation of the stimulus program. Another important study we 
conducted was the discovery of functionally important sub-patterns. On the one hand, mutual and 
some triangle sub-patterns (containing one- or two-pair mutual guarantee) were risky patterns with 
high default probability. However, cyclic triads and fully connected 3-node sub-patterns were most 
stable in the default process due to the peer monitoring between them. On the other hand, sub-
patterns of edge and 2-out-stars were most stable in the contagion process. Our functional sub-
patterns could shed light on the optimal structure design of guarantee networks to reduce the 
default and contagion probability. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the past decade, complex networks have been widely applied to model the structure or dynamics 
of real-world complex systems from different domains, such as social networks [1, 2], biological 
networks [3-6], Internet [7-9], collaboration networks [10-12], citation networks [13, 14], and 
financial networks [15-22]. 
 
Many of the complex networks have shared the same global statistical features, such as scale-free 
degree distribution [23], small-world property [24], and high clustering coefficient [40, 60]. The 
detailed explanations of these global properties were expressed as follows: If the degree 
distribution followed a power-law in the network, then 𝑝(𝑘)~𝑘−𝜆 [25]. Thereafter, we named this 
condition as a scale-free network, which indicated that nodes were only connected to few edges, 
and few hub nodes that were densely connected with other nodes existed. In addition, many real-
world networks have usually exhibited a relatively small average shortest path length, which 
indicated the small-world property [26-28]. The high clustering coefficient measured the extent in 
which node’s neighbors were also adjacent to each other. In real-world networks, nodes were 
expected to form such triads that resulted in a high average clustering coefficient of the networks. 
In social networks, this condition referred to the tendency that “friend of a friend was also a friend” 
[29, 30].  
 
In the past decade, complex network has been widely applied to model the structure. As we have 
mentioned, many of the complex networks have shared the same global statistical features, such 
as scale-free degree distribution [23], small-world property [24], and high clustering coefficient 
[40, 60]. Notably, networks with similar global characteristics that have significantly different 
local structures or networks with different global features may demonstrate similar basic structures 
[31]. In reality, many studies have revealed that several relationships existed between global 
topological properties (small-world character, high clustering coefficient, and scale-free feature) 
and key local sub-patterns [32]. Therefore, the local property was as important as global features 
to obtain a comprehensive analysis on a particular network. 
 
Aside from global topologies, the relative frequency of sub-patterns was the statistic of local 
structural property that could be calculated by the network motif detection. Motifs were recurrent 
small connected sub-patterns or microstructures that significantly displayed higher frequencies in 
a particular network than expected for a randomized network [31, 33]. Recently, this approach has 
been widely used to uncover the basic building blocks of networks. For instance, motifs have been 
found in networks from biochemistry, neurobiology, ecology, engineering food webs, neural 
networks, and the World Wide Web [34-38].  
 
In addition, network motifs were gathering much attention, largely because of the functional 
properties they reflected.  Because each of these patterned represents a particular interactive 
pattern of nodes in the network and reflected a framework which can easily result in particular 
functions or effects. Researchers [283, 367] have presented a novel analysis that picks out recurrent 
motifs (small sub-patterns) from complete networks. They applied their method to genetic 
regulatory networks, finding different motifs in each case. They have also made suggestions about 
the possible function of these motifs within the networks. In regulatory networks, for instance, 
they identified common motifs with particular switching functions in the system, such as gates and 
other feed-forward logical operations. Actually, a number of interesting functions of network 
motifs have been found, such as the prediction of protein–protein interaction, decomposition of 
hierarchical network and exploration of gene expression patterns [39, 40]. Thereby functional 
motifs can used as an important principle in the field  of structural design of complex network [41].  
 
In this study, we discuss the temporal and heterogeneous Chinese guarantee networks constructed 
from the guarantee relationship among firms. We focused on the basic local microstructures of 
guarantee networks, especially the dynamic frequency of occurrence of 15 different sub-patterns 
(two 2-node sub-patterns and 13 3-node sub-patterns) within the networks. In addition, we studied 
the financial characteristics of these 15 sub-patterns and found that large firms were likely to be 
the guarantors in a 2-out-stars pattern and small firms probably obtained loans through mutual 
guarantee. Furthermore, to our best knowledge, this work was the first to analyze sub-patterns to 
address the issues of guarantee network default and contagion risks and find that the optimal local 
structures in the guarantee networks were 2-out-stars and edge patterns. Our local sub-pattern 
analysis of dynamic heterogeneous Chinese loan guarantee networks is a useful approach to the 
risk management of the Chinese guarantee system. 
 
2 Data and network construction 
 In this study, we acquired a comprehensive dataset from the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, the official agency in China that regulates banking sectors. The data spanned from 
January 2007 to March 2012 and contain monthly information for all loans extended to the client 
firms, which had a credit line of above 50 million RMBs. These loan guarantee data were obtained 
from 19 nationwide Chinese commercial banks and accounted for nearly 80% of the total loans in 
China. These data could represent almost the entire loan guarantee relationships in China. 
Approximately 87900 firms and 84500 guarantee relationships were recorded from January 2007 
to March 2012.  
 
For each single loan guarantee, data on the guarantor and borrower firms and the time of the 
guarantee relationship were recorded. We also had detailed information, such as the amount of 
loan, assets, and liabilities of the firm.  
 
Our loan guarantee dataset ranged from January 2007 to March 2012, covering three important 
events in the global financial system: the bankruptcy of New Century Financial Corporation in 
April 2007, bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, and implementation of the 
Chinese’ four trillion-yuan economic stimulus program from November 2008 to December 2010. 
As three rare natural experiments, these events offered a good chance to investigate the changes 
on guarantee network from the perspective of topologies and local sub-patterns. In accordance 
with these rare shocks, we divided our data into the following four phases: 
 
• Phase 1 (April 2007 to August 2008). Financial crisis period. The bankruptcy of New 
Century Financial Corporation in April 2007 could be regarded as the beginning of a 
subprime mortgage crisis.  
 
• Phase 2 (September 2008 to October 2008). The most serious period of financial crisis. 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for bankruptcy in September 2008 and the global 
financial crisis reached the summit. 
 
 
• Phase 3 (November 2008 to December 2010). China has implemented the 4-trillion-yuan 
economic stimulus program. The stimulus program ended at the end of 2010. 
 
• Phase 4 (January 2011 to March 2012). This phase was the post-economic stimulus 
program period. 
 
At the beginning of the stimulus program, the monetary policy was ultra-loose. The People’s Bank 
of China started to tune the loose monetary policies in the second half of 2009. According to the 
central bank, this fine-tuning did not change the monetary policy but aimed to address the side 
effect caused by the ultra-loose monetary policy by making it further targeted, flexible, and 
forward-looking. This phenomenon was perceived as a signal to change the monetary policy. 
 
In March 2010 (17 months since the initiation of the stimulus program), the government work 
report delivered at the 11th National People’s Congress stated that the government planned to 
improve macro-control regulations in 2010.  
 
Since then, the People’s Bank of China increased the required reserve ratio for five times in 2010 
(from 15.5% to 18%). The major change of the monetary policy operations occurred on October 
20, 2010, when the People’s Bank of China raised the interest rates for the first time since the 
global financial crisis. These regulations and policy changes, to some extent, helped reduce the 
effects of the negative consequence of the stimulus program.  
 
To analyze the structure and dynamics of the Chinese guarantee system, we constructed dynamic 
guarantee networks using the guarantee relationships between firms. Each node represented a firm, 
and each edge connecting two nodes represented the existence of guarantee relationships between 
the two corresponding firms in a specific month. An edge went from the guarantor to the borrower. 
This dynamic guarantee network consisted of 63 monthly loan guarantee data, enabling us to 
analyze the evolution and dynamics of the network sub-patterns over time. In Figure 2.1, we 
simulated the dynamic guarantee network to give out a general impression.  
 
3. Motif detection of Chinese guarantee network 
  
Figure 1 All sub-patterns of sizes 2 and 3 in directed networks 
 
Figure 1 presents examples of guarantee relationships that are represented by directed edges 
between two and three nodes in the guarantee networks used for our study. Two types of 2-node 
sub-patterns and 13 types of 3-node sub-patterns are presented. These 15 sub-patterns were the 
elementary microstructures in our study. Motifs are sub-patterns that have a considerably higher 
frequency of occurrence in real networks than in several similar and randomized networks [42]. In 
the following, motif detection in guarantee networks is explained. 
 
First, we create several randomized yet similar networks, and the nodes in the randomized and real 
networks should have the same in- and out-degrees. Furthermore, we calculate the number of 2- 
and 3-node sub-patterns in the real and randomized networks. Finally, we detect the network 
motifs whose probability of occurrence in the real network is greater than that in the randomized 
networks. Statistically significant patterns can be found as motifs. However, motif detection is 
only suited to finding statistically important sub-patterns, and functionally insignificant sub-
patterns will be missed by this approach. We used FANMOD to find the motifs of 63 dynamic 
guarantee networks. Additional information about FANMOD can be gathered from [42].  
 
3.1 Static guarantee network motif detection 
 
We calculated the average results of motif detection from the 63 guarantee networks in Table 1 to 
show the integrated and general profiles of the motif detections. The indexes are briefly explained 
in Table 1, and the specific sub-patterns of the motifs are in Figure 2. 
 
1) Frequency [original] denotes the frequency of a sub-pattern in a real guarantee network. 
2) Mean-Freq [random] is the mean frequency of a sub-pattern in randomized networks. 
3) SD [random] represents the standard deviation from the mean frequency in the randomized 
networks. 
4) Z-score is the frequency in the real network minus the random frequency divided by the 
standard deviation. Thus, the larger the Z-Score, the more statistically significant the sub-
pattern. 
5) The p-value ranges from 0 to 1. The smaller the p-value, the more significant the motif. 
 
Table 1 Average motif detection of 63 guarantee networks 
Type Frequency [original] Mean-Freq [random] SD [random] Z-score p-value 
1 0.856252 0.999979 3.05E-05 −5041.85 1 
2 0.143748 2.1E-05 3.05E-05 5044.148 0 
3 0.470967 0.461571 6.27E-06 1530.45 0 
4 0.18356 0.192128 8.08E-06 −1134.72 1 
5 0.162021 0.173016 9.76E-06 −1197.04 1 
6 0.058856 0.068375 1.08E-05 −957.571 1 
7 0.076654 0.086416 8.14E-06 −1241.67 1 
8 0.016996 1.71E-05 1.15E-05 1606.41 0 
9 0.001107 4.49E-07 1.87E-06 614.2838 0 
10 0.01399 0.018469 3.52E-06 −1328.6 1 
11 0.004124 3.54E-06 5.21E-06 865.9048 0 
12 0.002691 1.51E-06 3.44E-06 816.2811 0 
13 0.004884 1.72E-06 3.66E-06 1372.92 0 
14 0.00334 1.66E-06 3.59E-06 968.8621 0 
15 0.000811 3.69E-09 9.51E-08 3186.1 0 
 
Table 1 shows that nine sub-patterns (types 2, 3, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15) had positive Z-scores 
and p-values of 0. Therefore, they were network motifs.  
 
 
Figure 2 Ranking of motifs based on Z-scores (from highest to lowest) 
 
Figures 2 (a) and (b) show the motifs, which are sorted from highest to lowest Z-scores, in the 2- 
and 3-node sub-patterns, respectively. In Figure 2 (a), type 2 can be defined as a mutual motif that 
represents the reciprocal guarantee relationship between two firms. Then, we consider the motifs 
in the 3-node sub-patterns. In Figure 2 (b), type 3 can be defined as a 2-out-stars motif, and types 
8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 can be called triangle motifs. Furthermore, network motifs are patterns 
of interconnections that more significantly recur among firms in guarantee networks than in 
randomized networks. The larger the Z-score of a motif, the greater the prevalence of such sub-
pattern in the real network. Therefore, mutual and triangle guarantee relationships may be favorite 
patterns formed among two or three firms.  
 
3.2. Dynamic motif detection of guarantee networks 
 
Analyzing the dynamics of the sub-patterns in guarantee networks can reveal the dynamic 
structural changes of the guarantee system, such as the evolution of preferential interaction patterns 
among firms. Our sample period covered two important economic events, namely, a financial crisis 
and the Chinese stimulus plan. Detecting the influence of these shocks on the local sub-patterns of 
a guarantee network was an interesting and significant research. In this section, we depict the 
evolution of relative frequency and the dynamical Z-score of the 15 sub-patterns in the guarantee 
networks (63 months).  
 
 Figure 3 Dynamic relative frequency of 15 sub-patterns 
 
 
Figure 4 Dynamic Z-scores of 15 sub-patterns 
 
The positive Z-scores revealed which sub-patterns more frequently recurred statistically in the 
guarantee network than in the random networks. As shown in Figure 4, the dynamically and 
consistently positive Z-scores of types 2, 3, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 indicated that they were 
motifs through the 63 guarantee networks.  
 
The guarantee network generally exhibited distinguished structural changes after the stimulus plan, 
as shown in Figure 3. The mutual guarantee network relationship decreased within the 2-node 
firms during the financial crisis (phases 1 and 2), thereby increasing the relative frequency of type 
1. However, the mutual guarantee relationship increased with the implementation of the Chinese 
stimulus plan, thus increasing the relative frequency and Z-score, as shown in Figures 3 and 4, 
respectively. Additionally, within the 3-node firms, the Z-scores of sub-patterns 3, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 
14, and 15 dramatically increased after the implementation of the Chinese stimulus plan. In our 
guarantee networks, such an overabundance of mutual and triangle motifs indicated that firms were 
more likely to form local highly connected (mutual and triangle) guarantee relationships than 
before because of the implementation of the stimulus plan.  
 
The increased significance of the mutual and triangle structures raised the question of why the 
enterprises in the guarantee network tended to form additional such patterns after the 
implementation of the stimulus plan. With the breakout of the global financial crisis in 2008, the 
Chinese government announced an economic stimulus program worth RMB ¥4 trillion (US $586 
billion) on November 9, 2008 to reduce the impact of the global financial crisis on the Chinese 
economy. This program aimed to resist the negative impact of the financial crisis by investing 
substantially in infrastructure and social welfare by 2010. The credit condition was loosened to 
help encourage loan applications from firms [43]. So companies needed to find guarantors for loan 
guarantee. Developing new guarantee relationships with friends (previous partners) or friends of 
friends was relatively easy, thereby resulting in an increase in the mutual and triangle structures in 
the guarantee networks (Figure 4).  
 
3.3 Relationship between financial characteristics and sub-patterns of firms 
 The previous section discusses the overabundant topological modules (motifs) in the guarantee 
networks, which represented the preferable guarantee patterns among firms. However, guarantee 
networks are heterogeneous, and clear differences exist among the attributes of firms, such as asset, 
liability, and leverage ratio. We assumed that firms with different financial characteristics may 
have varying preferable guarantee patterns. For example, a large firm may act as the guarantor in 
n-stars sub-patterns, and small firms were used to forming reciprocal guarantee relationships to 
obtain loans. Figures 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 illustrate the evolutions of the average assets, liabilities, and 
leverage ratios of the 15 sub-patterns. From the assets of the sub-patterns in Table 2, the sub-
patterns’ asset ranking could be visualized from largest to smallest, as shown in Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 5 Dynamic average assets of 15 sub-patterns 
 
 Figure 6 Dynamic average liabilities of 15 sub-patterns 
 
 
Figure 7 Dynamic average leverage ratios of 15 sub-patterns 
 
Figures 5, 6, and 7 reveal that the liability and leverage ratio trends of the 15 sub-patterns were 
highly correlated with their asset trends in Figure 5. This finding was consistent with the 
probability of large firms having large assets and low leverage ratios. 
 
During the financial crisis (phases 1 and 2), all sub-patterns but type 15 showed increased average 
assets and liabilities. Furthermore, most sub-patterns in phase 3 showed decreasing–increasing 
assets and liabilities, such as types 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14. In addition, a consistently 
increasing trend of assets and liabilities could be detected in types 8, 12, and 15. Therefore, these 
patterns were formed by large firms consistently. All sub-patterns but types 1 and 3 showed a 
decrease in leverage ratio during the financial crisis. During the stimulus plan, many sub-patterns 
showed decreasing–increasing trends of leverage ratio. Types 1, 3, 8, and 12 showed a consistently 
increasing trend, and type 15 exhibited a decreasing pattern. This observation indicated that the 
firms in type 15 were relatively safe with low leverage ratio. 
  
During phases 1 and 2, the firms’ assets and liabilities increased while their leverage ratio 
decreased because of the disappearance of small firms or firms with bad financial status during the 
financial crisis. An increasing number of small firms gradually went to the guarantee system with 
the implementation of the stimulus plan, thereby resulting in small average assets, liabilities, and 
leverage ratios. Subsequently, the requirements for obtaining guarantee loans were improved with 
the regulation of monetary policies. Consequently, small firms encountered difficulties in joining 
the guarantee system, thus resulting in increased assets, liabilities, and leverage ratios. 
 
Table 2 Ranking of firms’ financial features of sub-patterns (from largest to smallest) 
Type 
Average financial characteristic of sub-patterns (*104 RMB) 
Ranking of financial 
characteristic 
Average asset Average liability 
Average leverage 
ratio 
Asset Liability Leverage ratio 
1 1513569 982658.9 0.6517292 7 7 6 
2 690691.7 440146.1 0.638734 14 14 10 
3 4376488 3102802 0.704831 1 1 1 
4 2213963 1362460 0.64632 3 3 9 
5 2390572 1528595 0.659016 2 2 4 
6 1218511 792057.4 0.650403 11 9 7 
7 2009521 1324423 0.660412 4 4 3 
8 1831425 1244382 0.681132 5 5 2 
9 598596 364453 0.605777 15 15 11 
10 1233934 773117.2 0.627461 10 11 5 
11 1422483 927361.6 0.653117 8 8 8 
12 1704183 1102020 0.647092 6 6 13 
13 979832.6 605346.1 0.620402 13 13 12 
14 1254686 783227.3 0.626338 9 10 14 
15 1043484 644364.7 0.618822 12 12 15 
 
Table 2 ranks the 15 sub-patterns on the basis of their assets, liabilities, and leverage ratios, and 
this ranking was highly correlated and thus consistent with our analysis of Figures 5, 6, and 7 that 
large firms tended to have large liabilities and leverage ratios. In addition, large firms tended to 
form types 3, 5, and 4, which had no mutual guarantee and triangle, thereby denoting poorly 
interconnected patterns. Small firms may join a mutual guarantee [44] to help one another obtain 
loan guarantees and consequently improve their borrowing capacity. In China, mutual guarantee 
is a dominant guarantee that forms between small firms. Thus, sub-patterns 2, 10, and 15 which 
were formed by small firms, show mutual guarantee. 
 
 
Figure 8 Ranking of sub-patterns based on firms’ asset (from largest to smallest) 
 
Figure 8 shows that the average asset of the 2-out-stars sub-pattern in the guarantee network ranked 
first of all 13 3-node sub-patterns. We speculated that the large average asset of the 2-out-stars was 
caused by the large assets of the guarantors, which was due to the requirement of banks for 
borrower firms to provide guarantors with good financial characteristics (large assets) and thus 
increase the security of loan guarantee. In addition, small companies may voluntarily require large 
firms to act as guarantors to successfully obtain loan guarantees from banks. In addition, large 
firms could easily obtain loans from banks directly instead of going through a guarantee contract 
and were likely to be asked to act as guarantors in the network by many companies. Therefore, the 
corresponding sub-patterns in the network were n-stars. Accordingly, the 2-out-stars had the 
largest asset among all 3-node sub-patterns. 
 
However, the small assets of sub-patterns 13, 15, 6, 10, and 14 (Figure 8) showed that if mutual 
guarantee relationships existed in the sub-patterns, then the average asset of the pattern would be 
reduced. This condition indicated that small firms had a high probability of developing mutual 
guarantee relationships. A large body of literature has shown that small companies are likely to 
form mutual guarantee relationships to help one another improve their borrowing capacity and 
increase their chances of obtaining loans. In China, mutual guarantee is a dominant guarantee form 
between small firms. Thus, sub-patterns 13, 15, 6, 10, and 14, which had mutual guarantee, had 
small average firm assets. 
 
4. Analysis of functional sub-patterns 
 
Motif detection can obtain only statistically important sub-patterns, but sub-patterns with 
functional importance are also worth studying further. Sub-patterns with functional abilities or 
properties are useful in designing the structural principles of complex networks. Therefore, we 
proceeded with the detection of functionally important sub-patterns of guarantee networks from 
the perspectives of default risk and contagion capability. 
 
4.1 Analysis of high default sub-patterns 
 
 We started with the analysis of the high default patterns of the 15 sub-patterns. Figures 9, 10, and 
11 depict the dynamic frequency, default number, and default ratio (number of default/ total 
frequency) of the 15 sub-patterns, respectively.  
 Figure 9  Dynamic frequencies of 15 sub-patterns 
 
Figure 9 shows that during phases 1 and 2 (financial crisis period), most sub-patterns (excluding 
types 1, 3, and 12) significantly declined because the financial crisis induced the bankruptcy of 
firms and decreased the scale of guarantee networks. We supposed that types 1, 3, and 12 were the 
favorites or exhibited stable interaction patterns among firms during the financial crisis. In phase 
3, numerous loans were granted to companies with the implementation of the Chinese stimulus 
plan, thereby causing a sharp increase in the guarantee network scale. Thus, the frequencies of the 
15 sub-patterns increased dramatically.  
 
 Figure 10 Dynamic default frequencies of 15 sub-patterns 
 
Figure 10 shows that all sub-patterns but type 12 declined in default time during phases 1 and 2 
(financial crisis period). The declines were caused by the downward trend of risky firms in the 
guarantee network during the financial crisis. Additionally, the default frequencies of the sub-
patterns sharply dropped to nearly 0 in phase 3. These drops could be attributed to the loosened 
monetary policy that accompanied the Chinese stimulus plan. Credit conditions were loosened to 
help or encourage loan applications from firms [43]. A large amount of loans was released to SMEs, 
many of which were not eligible for loans before the stimulus program. Consequently, many firms 
could obtain new loans to repay or extend previous loans. The loosened monetary policy also 
lowered the credit standard for firms. Therefore, all 15 sub-patterns seldom showed default after 
the implementation of the stimulus plan.  
 
 Figure 11 Dynamic default ratios of 15 sub-patterns 
 
Figure 11 depicts the dynamic default ratios of the 15 sub-patterns. The default ratio defines the 
total default times relative to the total occurrence times of a certain sub-pattern. The higher the 
ratio, the higher the default risk of the sub-pattern. Figure 11 shows that all sub-patterns suffered 
declines in default ratio during phases 1 and 2 (financial crisis period), except for types 12 and 14, 
which showed increasing default ratios. These declines were mainly caused by the downward trend 
of risky firms in the guarantee network because of the financial crisis. Additionally, the default 
ratios of the sub-patterns sharply dropped in phase 3 after the implementation of the stimulus plan. 
We speculated that the declines were caused by the loosened monetary policy that accompanied 
the Chinese stimulus plan. As mentioned, the stimulus plan enabled firms to obtain loan extensions 
or borrow new loans to repay previous loans. Thus, the loosened loan requirement decreased the 
default ratios of all 15 sub-patterns.  
 
Table 3 Statistics of average default ratio of sub-patterns (from highest to lowest) 
Type Average default ratio (*10−3) Ranking 
1 1.574 7 
2 1.594 6 
3 1.101 12 
4 1.367 9 
5 1.541 8 
6 1.624 5 
7 1.194 11 
8 1.313 10 
9 0.157 15 
10 0.994 13 
11 2.689 2 
12 3.077 1 
13 2.289 3 
14 2.253 4 
15 0.233 14 
 
 
Figure 12 Ranking of sub-patterns based on default risk (from highest to lowest) 
 
Table 3 ranks the calculated average default ratios of the 15 sub-patterns (expiry time/total number) 
from highest to lowest default risk. The ranking in Figure 5.12 shows the sub-patterns with high 
default risk in red. Types 12, 11, 13, and 14 ranked first to fourth and thus were the highest default 
patterns among the 3-node sub-patterns, and types 15 and 9 were the lowest default patterns. The 
high default sub-patterns 12, 11, 13, and 14 shared the common characteristic of having triangles 
containing one or two mutual guarantee relationships. The low default patterns were cyclic triads 
(type 9) and fully connected 3-node (type 15) patterns.  
 The sub-patterns of high default risk are discussed in this section. Figure 8 shows that types 2, 12, 
11, 13, and 14 had small average assets and mutual guarantee relationships. In comparison with 
big companies, small firms have smaller chances of obtaining direct loans from banks because of 
limited collateral and lack of credit history [45]. Guarantors in guarantee contracts act as security 
for loans to SMEs, thereby bridging the gap in collateral and credit rating. Furthermore, small 
firms are likely to help one another obtain loan guarantees through mutual guarantee relationships. 
In China, a mutual guarantee is a dominant guarantee form between small companies. Scenarios 
wherein two small firms that could not obtain loans from banks managed to obtain loan guarantees 
simultaneously through mutual guarantee relationships led to the increase in the default risk of 
sub-patterns 2, 12, 11, 13, and 14. 
 
The following reasons explained the low default risks of the cyclic triads (type 9) and fully 
connected 3-node (type 15) patterns. Strong peer monitoring was established among three firms. 
The mutual supervision and mutually directed correlations in each 3-node sub-pattern made 
defaulting difficult and costly for any firm. In addition, on the basis of preceding observations, we 
found that types 9 and 15 had the smallest assets, liabilities, and leverage ratios. Therefore, the 
firms in these sub-patterns were the most stable forms of small firms with low default risk. 
 
4.2 Identification of high default patterns and firms in network 
 
In the previous section, only sub-patterns with high default probability are discussed and further 
analyzed in terms of financial characteristics. This section focuses on the financial characteristics 
of defaulted modules or firms in a specific sub-pattern. Additionally, the importance in risk 
management of locating risky patterns or firms from a certain sub-pattern is explained. We discuss 
the financial characteristics of high defaulted patterns and firms and demonstrate the rapid location 
of high defaulted patterns and firms in guarantee networks. 
 Figure 13 Comparison of kinds of pattern assets 
 
 
Figure 14 Comparison of kinds of firm assets 
 
Figures 13 and 14 illustrate whether sub-patterns or firms with large or small assets were likely to 
default. Figure 5.13 shows that a high default pattern tended to be paired with small assets, except 
for types 8, 9, 11, 13, and 14. Figure 14 shows the extracted financial characteristics of high 
defaulted firms. For types 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, and 15, high defaulted firms tended to have 
significantly smaller assets than other companies. Conversely, in types 2, 9, 10, 12, 13, and 14, 
default firms tended to have larger assets than other companies. Interestingly, the firms in sub-
patterns 12, 13, and 14, which had large assets, exhibited a higher probability to default than the 
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other firms in these patterns. Combining these findings with those for high default patterns, we 
speculated that big firms with high default risk existed in types 12, 13, and 14.  
 
 
Figure 15 High probability default position in sub-patterns (red nodes) 
 
In addition, the average in- and out-degrees of the firms that defaulted in the 15 sub-patterns 
provided hints for locating the exact positions of the default firms. According to these values, 
Figure 15 presents the results; the red nodes denote firms with high default risks. 
 
4.3. Analysis of high contagion sub-patterns 
 
This section focuses on the sub-patterns that played functionally important roles in promoting or 
prohibiting default contagion in guarantee networks. These patterns may shed light on the optimal 
structural design of guarantee networks with low contagion probability.  
 
First, we selected the growth rate of the number of defaulted firms in a sub-pattern to measure the 
contagion capability of this sub-pattern. The dynamic default frequencies of the 15 different sub-
patterns are shown in Figure 10. After the implementation of the Chinese stimulus plan, the number 
of defaulted firms dropped dramatically to nearly 0 because of the loosening of the monetary policy 
brought by the stimulus plan. Therefore, to elucidate the contagion capability of different sub-
patterns accurately, we selected the sample period from January 2007 to November 2008. This 
period was chosen because the other periods were mainly influenced by the stimulus plan and 
contagion in those periods was rare. 
 
  
Figure 16 Number of defaulted firms with polynomial regression with degree 5 
 
We adopted polynomial fittings to model the dynamic number of defaulted firms in the 15 sub-
patterns, as shown in Figure 5.16. With the polynomial regression of each sub-pattern’s number 
of defaulted firms, the average growth rates of the defaulted firms (contagion capability) of the 
sub-patterns could be calculated and are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Ranking of contagion capabilities of sub-patterns (from highest to lowest) 
Type Growth ratio of default firm number Ranking 
15 −0.00257 1 
9 −0.00476 2 
11 −0.00912 3 
8 −0.07155 4 
13 −0.07356 5 
14 −0.1468 6 
12 −0.29436 7 
10 −0.40118 8 
4 −0.81785 9 
6 −1.13945 10 
2 −1.1449 11 
7 −1.46157 12 
5 −2.3037 13 
3 −3.9391 14 
1 −4.2254 15 
 
In Table 4, the contagion capabilities are ranked from highest to lowest. Types 15 and 9 were high 
contagion patterns but with low default risks. Type 3 (2-out-stars) and type 1 (edge) exhibited the 
lowest contagion capability. These results indicated that the more prevalent the sub-patterns 1 and 
3, the more robust the entire guarantee network. Interestingly, sub-pattern 15 exhibited the lowest 
default risk but had a high contagion probability. In summary, edge (type 1) and 2-out-stars (type 
3) were prefect basic structural patterns with a small default risk and a low contagion capability. 
 
In the remaining part, we would like to use a simulation model to test the contagion capability of 
different sub-patterns. We assumed the relative frequency of sub-patterns which was of importance 
in default contagion will determine the contagion probability of the guarantee networks. In the 
following, our task is to develop a simulation model to examine the potential risk of cascading 
failures represented by the guarantee network. 
 
We represent the assets and liabilities of a firm i at time t as Ai(t) and Li(t), respectively. Gij(t) 
denotes the amount of loan guarantee firm i provides for firm j at time t. Following the literature 
in economics and finance, we adopt the Fermi distribution model to characterize the probability of 
default failure. Fermi distribution is a logistic function that was originally from quantum statistics, 
and has been successfully applied to modeling failures of firms and banks in economics and 
finance [46, 47]. In our research, Pi(t) is a Fermi logistic function that determines the probability 
that a firm defaults at time t: 
  P𝑖(t) =   
1
1+𝑒
−𝑘(
𝐿𝑖(𝑡)+∑ 𝑤𝑗(𝑡)𝐺𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
𝐴𝑖 (𝑡)
−𝛿)
                                                                                            (1)              
where k represents the influence of external environment, δ represents the mean value of the 
leverage ratio (total liabilities/total assets), and 𝑤𝑗(𝑡) represents whether firm j has failed. The 
leverage ratio is determined by the current assets and liabilities of a firm, as well as the assumed 
debt caused by the failure of the firms to which i provides guarantee. Intuitively, the higher the 
leverage ratio a firm has, the more likely it would fail.  
 
The simulation is based on the aforementioned dynamic guarantee network and the financial 
characteristics obtained from real-world data. We simulated the failures of firms caused by random 
initial failures (random attack) in one month. In particular, for each month, the simulation runs as 
follows: 
1) Initial failures. At the beginning of each simulation (t=1), 5% of firms were randomly 
selected to be the initial failures. The selected firms default, and their liabilities will be 
assumed by the adjacent firms in the network.  
2) Failure propagations. At each time step t, we determine whether a firm i fails or not at 
time t based on equation (1).  
3) Finish. The simulation keeps running until there is no firm fails at 𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ, 𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ ≥ 1. 
We run procedure 1) to 3) for 10,000 times for each month from January 2007 to March 2012 (63 
months), and take the average ratio of failed firms for each month. Figure 17 presents the 
simulation results.  
 
 
Figure 17 Contagion in the guarantee network. 
 
A comparison of Figures 17 (evolution of network fragility) and 3 (dynamic frequency of sub-
patterns) shows that the dynamic trend of the average ratios of failed firms was similar to that of 
13 of the sub-patterns (excluding types 1 and 3). Then, we performed a correlation test between 
the random simulation results of the initial failed ratio of 5% and the relative frequency of the 15 
sub-patterns. Figure 18 indicates that the correlations between the average ratio of failed firms and 
the 13 sub-patterns were remarkably high (The correlation coefficients ranged from 0.85 to 0.96, 
p-value < 0.001.). However, types 1 and 3 had significantly negative correlations with the 
contagion probability of the guarantee network. This result indicated that the more prevalent the 
sub-patterns of edge (type 1) and 2-out-stars (type 3), the more robust the entire guarantee network. 
 
The above findings were in line with our aforementioned results about the detection of functionally 
important sub-patterns with high contagion capability, which showed that patterns of edge and 2-
out-stars were the most stable sub-patterns in contagion and triangle subgraphs could accelerate 
contagion propagation and amplification. 
 
Figure 18 Correlation between frequency of sub-patterns and contagion probability 
 
5. Conclusions 
  
To our knowledge, we were the first to analyze heterogeneous and dynamic guarantee networks 
from the perspective of local structures. First, we found the statistically and functionally important 
sub-patterns in Chinese guarantee networks. Firms in such networks have a special preference for 
forming local mutual and triangle relationships. Additionally, network motifs have been widely 
used in biochemistry, neurobiology, ecology, and engineering systems [61–63] [64, 65], which are 
considered homogeneous networks with equivalent objectives. By contrast, the firms in our 
guarantee networks were heterogeneous. Therefore, we further analyzed the correlation between 
the firms’ financial attributes and favorable sub-patterns. We found that large firms tended to be 
guarantors in the 2-out-stars motif, and small firms were likely to form mutual guarantee 
relationships to acquire loans from banks. In addition, we demonstrated an approach to rapidly 
locating high default firms in guarantee networks. Finally, we found that cyclic triads (type 9) and 
fully connected 3-node (type 15) patterns had the lowest default risks, and the sub-patterns of edge 
(type 1) and 2-out-stars (type 3) possessed low contagion capabilities. Therefore, our study may 
shed light on the preferential guarantee patterns among firms and the optimal structural design for 
reducing default or contagion in guarantee networks. Our analysis can help the government and 
banks in monitoring the default spread status and provide insights into taking precautionary 
measures to prevent and solve systemic financial risks. 
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